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Abstract
Law in modern market societies serves both democratic and economic
functions. In its economic function, law is a service, a means of enhancing
the value of transactions and organizations. Yet modern market economies
continue to rely on the state, rather than the market, to provide this service.
This paper investigates whether private provision of law may be superior
to public provision. We look in particular at corporate law, where there
is a substantial literature exploring the e¢ ciency implications of ￿regula-
tory competition￿ and compare this competition with market competition
between private providers. Drawing from the well-known framework of spa-
tial models of imperfect competition, we argue that while neither public nor
private competition may lead to the optimal corporate law regimes, there
are at least some reasons to believe that private provision may be prefer-
able. Speci￿cally, we present a model that demonstrates in which regulatory
competition is likely to produce widespread emulation, and little innovation.
Private competition, in contrast, is more likely to lead to greater ￿product￿
di⁄erentiation, which bene￿ts heterogeneous consumers of corporate law ser-
vices in the short term. Moreover, such di⁄erentiation also has long-term
bene￿ts, as providers are able ￿learn￿ more about business organizations￿
demand-side characteristics, and thus tailor their services to business needs
more e⁄ectively.
￿Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law School; Principal, LECG,
LLC.
yProfessor of Law, University of Southern California Law School; Senior Economist,
RAND Corporation Institute for Civil Justice. Thanks to Jennifer Arlen, Ehud Kamar,
and Ed Sherry for helpful discussions. All errors are ours.
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In modern market democracies, law serves a multitude of functions. It reg-
ulates the relationship between state and citizen, providing the framework
for democratic governance. It protects individual rights, accomplishes the
transfers inherent in the welfare state, and maintains social order. And it
provides the structure for economic activity: establishing property rights
and providing a means of commitment and dispute resolution to support
transactions and organizations.
The democratic functions of law￿ those that involve the fundamental so-
cial contract between the governed and the government￿ are provided almost
exclusively by state actors: public courts and legislatures established and
regulated in turn by constitutional documents or principles. Most notions
of democratic legitimacy virtually require that the state play this role. In-
deed, a basic principle of democracy is taht the state may exercise power
and only exercise power vis-a-vis the governed through institutions that are
accountable, ultimately, to the polity.
What is less clear, however, is why the economic functions of law￿ the
market structuring functions￿ are produced by the state. Why does the
state assume responsibility for designing the structure of the relationships
within and between economic entities when the instrumental objective is
not democratic legitimacy, but rather market e¢ ciency? Law in its eco-
nomic function is largely a service. It enhances the value of transactions.
it coordinates activities, provides a means of commitment and resolves dis-
putes in the cooperative endeavors that characterize economic activity. The
optimal provision of law in these functions means the e¢ cient design and
implementation of the rules that structure and regulate the market economy.
Had￿eld (2000, 2001) has explored these issues in general terms, raising
the question whether the economic functions of law might be better provide
by private, competitive, entities rather than the state. In this paper, we
explore a speci￿c instance of this question￿ namely the e¢ ciency implications
of public versus private provision of the law of corporations. Corporate
law allows the creation of a distinct legal entity, capable of engaging in
transactions (owning property, lending and borrowing capital, entering into
and enforcing contracts) as an actor separate from its shareholders. When
corporate law is functioning well it o⁄ers e¢ cient means of accomplishing
these functions. Our question, then, is whether we should expect public
entities to provide e¢ cient corporate law or whether competitive private
entities would do a better job.
E¢ ciency analysis preoccupies the literature in corporate law. This
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between the states for the "business" of supplying corporate charters and
an associated law of corporations to incorporating ￿rms will lead to e¢ -
ciency. In one view (Winter 1977, Dodd and Leftwich 1980, Fischel 1982)
this competition, by analogy to what happens when private ￿rms compete
to provide goods, is a "race to the top," achieving e¢ ciency as states with
less e¢ cient o⁄erings lose out to those with more e¢ cient o⁄erings. In other
views (Cary 1974, Bebchuk 1992), there are imperfections in this competi-
tion which impede the race (such as agency problems which cause states to
cater to the interests of managers, who control the incorporation decision,
rather than shareholders) sometimes leading to a "race to the bottom" and
a need for federal as opposed to state regulation. In a recent version of
this view, Bebchuk and Ferrell (2001) suggest that, at least with respect to
take-over law, competition between the states has resulted in the states all
essentially o⁄ering the same, sub-optimal, restrictions on takeovers.
Regardless of whether one adopts the optimistic or pessimistic view,
what this literature overlooks is the option of private, rather than public,
provision of corporate law. Even more fundamentally, it has generally not
taken care to examine the nature of "competition" between states and leg-
islatures and the aptness of analogizing state competition to competition
between pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms.1 Most of the attention has been focused
on demand side imperfections, namely agency problems between managers
and shareholders. Even when attention is paid to the nature of supply-
side pressures and possible imperfections, as in Macey and Miller￿ s (1987)
interest-group model of competition, the assumption persists that the rev-
enues generated by a state￿ s corporate law regime (whether collected by the
treasury or by local corporate lawyers), on the margin, spur the "state" to
exploit opportunities to increase revenue by making corporate law more at-
tractive to incorporating ￿rms. Finally, as some commentators have pointed
out (Bebchuk and Ferrell 2001), even the empirical tests suggesting that
there are positive returns to incorporating in Delaware as opposed to other
1Participants in this literature have at times observed that the speci￿cs of state "compe-
tition" are poorly de￿ned. Romano (1985) points out that those writing in this literature
"never clearly specify what the states are actually supposed to be maxiizing, such as net
or gross revenues." (p.228,n3.) Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) raise the question of what
legislator￿ s motives are, and observe that "no legislator can capture the bene￿ts to the
state of increased revenues" (p. 216). Bebchuk (1992) discusses legislators￿(and other
state actors￿ ) incentives and concedes that they may be multi-faceted and complex, but
concludes that it is nonetheless appropriate to assume that "a state￿ s interest in attract-
ing incroporations shapes the behavior of the individuals actually involved in the state￿ s
lawmaking process." (p. 1454)
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do not support the conclusion that competition between the states leads
to e¢ cient corporate law; they only support a conclusion that Delaware￿ s
corporate law may be less ine¢ cient than others.2
Is it in fact the case that competition between the states can lead to
e¢ cient production of corporate law? What are the incentives facing courts
and legislatures to produce e¢ cient law? Even if it were shareholders rather
than managers making the selection of state of incorporation, what basis
is there for thinking that states will behave like private pro￿t-maximizing
￿rms, allowing us the bene￿t of the welfare theorems that indicate that
"competition" will lead to socially-optimal outcomes?
This paper takes a ￿rst step towards addressing these questions, explic-
itly modeling the e¢ ciency characteristics of public versus private provision
of corporate law. We model the incentives of legislators explicitly as in-
centives to capture private bene￿ts, which is accomplished by the costly
transformation of public revenues into increased reelection chances. We al-
low for the (realistic) possibility that there is not a single optimal corporate
regime: we assume that incorporating ￿rms are heterogenous with respect
to the ideal regime.3 Finally, we allow for learning about the distribution
of incorporating ￿rms with respect to ideal corporate law and innovation by
corporate law providers to meet the needs of these ￿rms.
We demonstrate that under plausible conditions (most importantly, that
the marginal private bene￿t arising from an increase in public revenues
is eventually outweighed by the marginal private cost to the legislator of
achieving that bene￿t) competition between the states does not lead to the
optimal corporate law regimes and that the regimes resulting from com-
petition among private pro￿t-maximizing entities achieve greater e¢ ciency.
Speci￿cally, we demonstrate that states will tend to emulate one another:
state competition will lead to both insu¢ ciently diverse corporate law of-
ferings and o⁄eringss that will generally bear no relation to the optimal
structure for incorporating ￿rms. Moreover, state providers of corporate
law will fail to learn about the distribution of incorporating ￿rms and will
not innovate to produce regimes that better suit the needs of these ￿rms.
Private providers, on the other hand, while perhaps also failing to provide
2There are reasons to question even this inference, as these tests may not adequately
account for the confounding fact that ￿rms that (re)incorporate in Delaware and enjoy
abnormal positive returns do so because of factors other than the quality of Delaware
corporation law.
3The regulatory competition has sometimes noted the question of heterogeneity among
incorporating ￿rms. See Posner and Scott (1980) and Baysinger and Butler (1985).
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entiate their o⁄erings and hence better serve the needs of a heterogeneous
population of incorporating ￿rms. They will also realize greater incentives
to learn and design new regimes tailored to the distribution of incorporating
￿rms.
Our results highlight the fundamental insight that "competition" bete-
ween public entities such as legislatures cannot be simply analogized to
competition between private entities. Legislatures in our model do face an
incentive to capture the business of incorporating ￿rms and, especially, fear
losing that business. But the rewards they face￿ satisfying voters and cam-
paign contributors and hence achieving reelection￿ do not create the kind of
marginal incentive that lead to e¢ cient o⁄erings. Legislators only bene-
￿t from increasing public revenues from corporate law to the extent that
they are able to transform those revenues into private bene￿ts. The mar-
ginal bene￿t to them is not equal to the marginal increase in net revenues
(pro￿ts). Moreover, because we believe it is plausible to assume that the
marginal bene￿t to the legislator is eventually zero, in equilibrium legislators
are uninterested in competing for additional revenues. This is a fundamen-
tal distinction between state "competition" and private competition and
the basis for our conclusion that private entities will, in general, o⁄er more
e¢ cient corporate law regimes.
We develop the model in Section II and prove our results for the static
case in Section III and the dynamic (learning and innovation) case in Sec-
tion IV. Section V interprets our results, discusses their generalization and
limitation, and o⁄ers concluding remarks.
2 A Model of Law Provision
In this section, we develop our arguments more formally, using a familiar
spatial competition framework drawn from the industrial organizations lit-
erature. Our principal aim here is to demonstrate more precisely how,
insofar as public providers have incentives that diverge from simple pro￿t
maximization, regulatory competition among public providers of corporate
law might di⁄er considerably from that which would be provided privately.
We identify both short- and long-run di⁄erences between regulatory and pri-
vate competition predicted by the model. In the short run, public providers
produce substantive law that di⁄ers considerably from that which private
competitors would o⁄er, favoring emulation over product di⁄erentiation.
In the long run, emulation among public providers leads to less equilibrium
5
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tailor their o⁄erings over time to ￿￿t￿the characteristics of the regulated
population.
2.1 The Demand Side: Incorporating Firms
Consider a population of pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms, independently selecting
among a limited menu of standard-form corporate governance regimes that
they might adopt. This is the decision of ￿where￿to incorporate and the
regime governing the corporate charter. Throughout what follows, assume
that all ￿rms within the relevant population wish to incorporate, and place
a relatively large value on so doing. Given this desire, the problem that each
￿rm faces is one of ￿nding the best ￿t: i.e., the corporate governance regime
that best matches the organization￿ s speci￿c needs.
To represent this dilemma conceptually, we posit that ￿rms are het-
erogeneous in nature, and that each ￿rm can be identi￿ed with a unique
governance regime that is ￿ideal￿ for that ￿rm. For example, one type
of ￿rm may be particularly well suited to a governance regime that gives
great deference to managerial discretion (e⁄ectively adopting an extreme
form of the business judgment rule), while another might be well suited to a
structure that heavily scrutinizes managerial decision making. Yet another
￿rm￿ s ideal organizational structure, in contrast, might lie somewhere be-
tween these extreme ends of the spectrum. In order to capture the ￿ avor
of this regulatory environment, suppose that the universe of possible gover-
nance structures can be represented by a one-dimensional interval, ranging
￿ for example ￿ from highly deferential (on the left boundary) to highly
invasive (on the right).4 Because of the uniqueness of this ideal point, each
individual ￿rm can be associated with an organizational type, which we de-
note by x 2 [0;1]:When matched up with its ideal governance form, each
￿rm would be willing to pay up to K > 0 dollars to procure governance ser-
vices. For the purposes of this paper, we make the simplifying assumption
that K is relatively ￿large￿relative to other parameters of the model.5
Since the number of governance forms available in practice may be lim-
ited, a representative ￿rm must factor in at least two considerations when
4To be sure, most governance regimes have more than one relevant dimension, and
it may be possible to generalize our framework to multiple dimensions. We resist that
temptation here, however, both for the sake of tractability and to expose core intuitions.
5This assumption assures that ￿rms will consume from some provider. It is possible
to relax this assumption without changing our qualitative results, but at the cost of some
additional notation.
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(which can include chartering fees, anticipated dispute resolution costs such
as legal fees, and even taxes when the provider is public)6 that the provider
charges for a ￿rm to organize thereunder. All else held constant, regimes
that charge low prices are more attractive than those that charge high fees.
Second, the ￿rm will care about how well the governance scheme it chooses
￿￿ts￿with its organizational type. Explicitly, should a ￿rm of type x choose
an organizational structure of type a 6= x; the ￿rm must incur a cost to
remedy the mismatch between its innate organizational needs and the cho-
sen governance regime. One way of doing so is to re-shape its authority
relationships to track that which is envisioned in the governance regime; or
alternatively, the ￿rm may hold its organizational structure constant and ei-
ther run the risk of inappropriate (sub-optimal) legal interventions or expend
costs to, if possible, ￿contract around￿the rules provided by the governance
regime, supplementing them with more tailored terms.
In either case, regardless of whether the ￿rm adapts itself to ￿t the
governance structure or vice versa, its e⁄ort is assumed to come at a cost
￿ (x ￿ a)
2 ; where ￿ > 0: Note that this adaptation cost increases in the
(squared) distance between the governance scheme and the ￿rm￿ s type. All
told, then, if the provider of governance scheme ai charges a price of pi for
its chartering services, the total cost to the ￿rm of type x adopting this
structure will be:
pi + ￿ ￿ (x ￿ ai)
2
Thus, if it chooses to incorporate, each ￿rm will do so with the provider that
imposes the lowest expected cost. To illustrate, suppose that two providers,
A1 and A2; o⁄ered governance / price packages of (a1;p1) and (a2;p2);
respectively, and assume (without loss of generality) that a1 ￿ a2: A ￿rm
with ideal structure x would strictly favor incorporating with A1 rather than
A2 if: p1+￿ ￿(x ￿ a1)
2 < p2+￿ ￿(x ￿ a2)
2 : If a1 = a2, this implies that the
￿rm incorporates with whichever provider has a lower price, unless p1 = p2,
in which case the ￿rm randomizes equally between the two providers. If
a1 6= a2, then a ￿rm that chooses to incorporate wil do so with A1 if the
following holds:
x < x￿ ￿








6To keep our comparison with private provision realistic, we can imagine that states
charge corporations fees or taxes to recapture the cost of the corporation￿ s use of the state
corporate law and judicial institutions. See Kahan & Kamar (2001).
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randomizes, incorporating with each provider with probability 1
2).
Many conventional models of spatial competition (e.g., Hotelling 1929;
Salop 1979, 1982) assume that the distribution of customers is common
knowledge. Such an assumption is a bit extreme for the regulatory com-
petition we envision here, since one critical question in this debate is how
much innovation (if any) providers produce as they learn over time about
the preferences of the communities they regulate. Thus, rather than assume
the distribution of organizational types to be known with certainty, we sup-
pose instead that ￿rm types are distributed according to a CDF denoted by
F (xj￿); where ￿ = f￿1;￿2g represents a distributional parameter that itself
is a random variable, with associated conditional density function f (xj￿).
The realized value of ￿ is meant to embody where the bulk of ￿rms
are ￿located￿ in regulatory space, and the fact that ￿ is itself a random
variable re￿ ects the notion that providers are not fully informed ex ante
about this location (but might learn about it over time). To keep things
analytically tractable, we make three simplifying assumptions about the
structure F (xj￿) consistent with these notions. First, we assume that the
true population of ￿rms is destributed along one of two partitioning sub-
intervals of [0;1]; each having length 1
2: Thus, if ￿ = ￿1; the distribution is
￿skewed￿toward the lower sub-interval of the unit interval, so that all ￿rms
are located between 0and 1
2: Second, we suppose that viewed ex ante, each
realization ￿k occurs with equal probability 1
2: And ￿nally, we assume that
regardless of which value of ￿ obtains, the population of ￿rms is distributed
uniformly along the corresponding subinterval. (All of these assumptions
can be simpli￿ed without substantially changing our results7). Formally,
then, for any k 2 f1;2g; the density of x conditional on ￿k takes the form:
f (xj￿k) =
￿







In the absence of information about the realization of ￿; the unconditional
density of x is simply the expectation of f (xj￿k) over all realizations of ￿ :
f (x) ￿ E￿ [f (xj￿k)] =
￿
1 if x 2 [0;1]
0 else
; (3)
7That is, it is possible to generalize the analysis into more general distribution func-
tions, asymmetric (and even overlapping) supports for each realization ￿k; and asymmetric
probability distributions for each ￿k: What is key for our results, however, is that the dis-
tributional supports for at least two of the realizations of ￿ must be disjoint.
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unit interval.
2.2 Private Providers
Private providers have a conventional maximand in our model. We assume
that private providers operate to maximize their total expected variable prof-
its. Explicitly, each ￿rm i chooses a location ai and a price pi to maximize its
net pro￿ts. Each unit of output (i.e., set of corporate governance services)
that the provider produces comes at a marginal cost of c, which we assume to
be constant across ￿rms. Let Di (ai;pi;a￿i;p￿i;￿) denote the demand gen-
erated by ￿rm i when the ￿rm￿ s competitors o⁄er (possibly vector-valued)
combinations of locations and prices of a￿i and p￿i; respectively, and the






F(x￿ j ￿) if a1 6= a2
1 if a1 = a2and p1 < p2
0 if a1 = a2 and p1 > p2
1









1 ￿ F(x￿ j ￿) if a1 6= a2
0 if a1 = a2and p1 < p2
1 if a1 = a2 and p1 > p2
1




Consequently, ￿rm i￿ s expected pro￿t is given by
E￿ [￿i (ai;pi)] ￿ E￿ [(pi ￿ c) ￿ Di (ai;pi;a￿i;p￿i;￿)]; (5)
which we assume to be the maximand of private providers. And thus, each
provider takes its competitors￿strategies as given and solves the following:
Maxfai;pigE￿ [￿i (ai;pi)] (6)
2.3 Public Providers
The central premise of the regulatory competition literature is that legisla-
tors (and other public actors) e⁄ectively behave like pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms,
choosing laws and regulations that maximize state "pro￿ts."8 Our principal
contribution is to challenge that assumption.
8Kahan and Kamar (2002) have challenged the assumption that there is any money to
be made by the state through corporate law. We assume that legislators could, if they
chose, generate substantial revenues through corporate law and instead focus on their
incentives to do so.
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there is substantial disagreement about the extent to which legislators are
motivated by the public interest as opposed to their own private bene￿ts,
such as reelection or the pursuit of private policy goals, in exercising their
public o¢ ce. The regulatory competition literature has not attempted to
specify what motivates legislators in choosing corporate law regimes beyond
the assumption that legislators will choose a regime that maximizes the
state￿ s net revenues (taxes and other state revenues minus public expendi-
tures). This does not adequately account for legislator incentives however
because it does not explain why legislators gain utility from increases in
state revenues. Unlike the shareholders of a ￿rm, these are not revenues
that legislators can directly (costlessly) convert to their own private con-
sumption.
The implicit model in the regulatory competition literature could be a
public interest model: legislators are motivated by their obligation to im-
prove the ￿scal position of the state. But if legislators were truly motivated
by public interest, it would be hard to explain why they choose legal regimes
that maximize revenues rather than simply choosing the optimal legal regime
from a social welfare point of view. The very point of the regulatory compe-
tition literature, however, seems to be that ￿states￿won￿ t choose the optimal
legal regime unless they have a monetary incentive to do so, namely generat-
ing tax and other revenues. Clearly, then, the regulatory competition model
has in mind something other than legislators acting on the basis of pure
public interest. Once we recognize that ￿states￿do not make legal regime
choices, legislators (and other public actors such as courts) do, however,
we cannot simply appeal to the increase in state revenues as the ￿private￿
bene￿t that spurs regulatory competition. We need to explain how state
revenues are converted into private bene￿ts for legislators.
The central feature of our model of public providers of corporate law is
an assumption that it is costly for legislators to convert state revenues into
private bene￿ts. It is the costliness of capturing private bene￿ts from state
revenues that constitutes the essential di⁄erence between public and private
competition and explains why we predict that public providers will not do
as well as private providers in generating welfare-improving corporate law
regimes.
To make this concrete, we adopt one of the conventional assumptions
from the positive political economy literature (see e.g., Mayhew 1974, Fior-
ina 1977) and assume that legislators derive utility from holding o¢ ce and
are thus motivated to achieve reelection. Our results doe not depend on
the particular private bene￿t obtained by the legislator; what is important
10
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but rather are procured from public revenues at some private cost to the
legislator. Thus we can reformulate the interpretation of the model to re-
place reelection with the pursuit of personal policy preferences or personal
consumption (such as the enjoyment of prestige or status). We discuss the
model in terms of reelection only for concreteness.
Speci￿cally, we assume that each state i has a single legislator Ai who
selects the state￿ s corporate governance regime and sets the price (taxes and
other fees) simultaneously with her counterparts in other states. (Note that
by assuming a single legislator in each state we bias our result towards the
conclusion of the regulatory competition literature which assumes that a
state acts like a uni￿ed decisionmaker.) A legislator who achieves reelection
enjoys private bene￿ts ￿ U > 0; a legislator who loses o¢ ce receives U = 0.
Let qi be the probability of reelection. We can interpret the standard
regulatory competition model to be an assumption that qi is a function of
the state￿ s net corporate law revenues, ￿i, and we adopt this assumption
also. We also assume, however, that public revenues increase reelection
chances qi only through the expenditure of costly e⁄ort on the part of the
legislator. The legislator may have to publicize her accomplishments to
voters in order to sway their votes. She may have to entertain lobbying
e⁄orts or engage in research to determine where to most e⁄ectively (from
a reelection/campaign ￿nance perspective) direct public expenditures paid
for with corporate law revenues. Let ri be this cost. We assume that riis
also a function of net revenues, ￿i. We assume that qi (￿i) and ri (￿i) are
both continuous and twice di⁄erentiable on [0;1):
We can then de￿ne a function, wi, the net private bene￿t realized by the
legislator as a result of generating net corporate law revenues:
wi (￿i) = qi (￿i) ￿ U ￿ ri (￿i) (7)
We impose a condition on this private bene￿t function, namely that there
exists a ￿nite threshold (denoted by ￿ ￿i), such that for values of ￿i below ￿ ￿i;
wi is non-decreasing and beyond ￿ ￿i; wi is non-increasing. Speci￿cally, for
￿i > ￿ ￿i :
q0
i (￿i) ￿ U < r0
i (￿i) (8)
that is, the marginal private cost of increasing reelection chances exceeds
the marginal private (reelection) bene￿t to the legislator. Thus beyond ￿ ￿i
net private bene￿t is decreasing in public revenues and we can de￿ne ￿ wi, the
11
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Pressmaximum net private bene￿t that the legislator can obtain from generating
corporate law revenues for the state.
The condition we impose on wi can be motivated in several ways. The
simplest is to posit a world in which corporate law revenues are, at their
maximum, so small as to have negligible e⁄ect on a legislator￿ s reelection
chances. Kahan and Kamar (2002) suggest this may be the case, pro-
viding evidence that "no state stands to gain meaningful tax revenues or
legal business from chartering ￿rms." In our model, this would amount to
q0
i (￿i) = 0 for all ￿i or ￿ ￿i = 0. Because we want to take the regulatory
competition claim seriously, in the sense that legislators could face an in-
centive to improve their corporate law o⁄erings in order to increase improve
their re-election chances, we assume
￿ ￿i > 0 (9)
and de￿ne w = w(0). Then condition (9) implies that
w < ￿ w (10)
Even if some small reelection gains may be achieved from generating cor-
porate law revenues, however, it may plausibly be the case that the cost of
conveying this information to voters or potential campaign contributors in a
meaningful and e⁄ective way quickly exceeds the marginal bene￿ts of doing
so (￿ ￿i = ￿).
Condition (10) can also be anchored in a median voter model (e.g., Black
1948). In a full information model without uncertainty with voters arrayed
along a single-peaked dimension, the legislator achieves reelection with cer-
tainty at the point at which the median voter decides to vote for her. If the
median voter is motivated by the legislator￿ s ability to generate revenues for
the state (used to purchase public goods, for example), then there is a level
of revenue ￿ ￿i at which the median voter will choose the legislator over her
challengers. This version of the median voter model would imply qi is a step
function equal to zero up to ￿ ￿i and equal to 1 at and beyond ￿ ￿i.
This median voter model would satisfy condition (10) even in the ab-
sence of costs associated with e⁄orts to communicate with the median voter
and hence obtain his or her vote. More generally, however, if there is uncer-
tainty about the median voter￿ s behavior and preferences it is plausible to
assume that the probability of securing the median voter￿ s vote increases as
￿i grows but that simultaneously the cost of e⁄orts to secure that vote also
12
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e￿t. These costs may come from straightforward advertising costs, which
increase on the margin as the e⁄ort is made to sway voters who are more
and more demanding. The costs may come from the limited capacity of
the legislator to devote e⁄ort to personally conveying information to voters
through campaign speeches, appearances, and so on.
In a more general model, with voting and campaign contributions de-
pendent on a multitude of factors, costs associated with transforming public
revenues into private bene￿ts may also increase on the margin, and so exceed
the marginal bene￿t, as a legislator seeking reelection is forced to go after
voters or contributors that are farther removed from his or her core con-
stituency. These costs may come directly from the cost of communicating
with a group that is less inclined to hear one￿ s message or distrustful: some
voters, for example, probably cannot be swayed to vote for some legislators
no matter how e⁄ective they are at raising public revenues. These costs
may also come indirectly from the need to juggle greater con￿ icts across
constituencies￿ trading one group￿ s interests against another￿ s and hence in-
curring a cost with the losing group.
Marginal costs of improving reelection chances may also begin to exceed
marginal bene￿ts in a world in which powerful constituencies are created
that pressure a legislator to compromise other goals, such as the achievment
of privately preferred policy outcomes. This may be a particularly impor-
tant source of distortion for legislators with respect to corporate law. When
a state attracts increased business from corporations, it not only generates
increased public revenues through taxes and other fees, it also generates in-
creased private income for lawyers in the state. Corporate lawyers are thus
an increasingly important source of campaign funds, and an increasingly
powerful constituency.
Regardless of which interpretation one chooses, the legislator￿ s problem
can be expressed as one of selecting a governance and pricing regime to max-
imize her expected net bene￿ts from reelection. Equivalently, each public
provider takes its competitors￿strategies as given and solves the following:
Maxfai;pigE￿ [ wi (￿i (ai;pi))]: (11)
For simplicity, in what follows we assume that the providers are symmetric,
such that wi (:) = w(:) and ￿ ￿i = ￿ ￿ for all i:
13
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We now turn to the derivation of the socially optimal corporate law regime
and the equilibrium o⁄erings of private and state providers. We begin
with the static one-period solution in which the distribution of incorporating
￿rms is unknown and we assume that there are two potential providers. We
denote these providers as a1 and a2 and assume (without loss of generality)
that a1 ￿ a2.
In analyzing the equilibria of the game (particularly for the case of public
providers), it may sometimes become necessary to select among multiple
equilibria for the game. In such instances, we shall impose a (relatively
intuitive) Pareto criterion as to the payo⁄s of the providers for selecting
among these equilibria. This criterion is embodied in Assumption P below:
Assumption P: Consider an equilibrium of the location/pricing game for





o⁄s to the providers of ￿￿
1 and ￿￿
2: Such an equilibrium is selected





2g yielding payo⁄s ￿0
1 and ￿0





j for some j 2 f1;2g:
The rationale behind Assumption P is quite simple. It essentially asserts
that the most plausible equilibria (from the providers￿perspective) are the
ones that are not Pareto dominated, and that providers will always be able
to coordinate on one such equilibrium rather than selecting an alternative
that makes no provider better o⁄ while making some provider(s) worse o⁄.
This assumption is appropriate for our goal of testing the e¢ ciency claims
of the regulatory competition literature in that the literature assumes states
act to maximize state revenues. Note that Assumption P is relatively
weak in the sense that it does not dictate a choice among equilibria on the
Pareto e¢ cient domain. On the other hand, the assumption applies only
to the payo⁄s of the providers and not that of the consumers. And thus,
Assumption P may nonetheless select against socially e¢ cient allocations
once consumer welfare is taken into account. This too is appropriate for
testing the claims of the regulatory competition literature, which assumes
that states require a monetary incentive in the form of revenue and do not
act in the public interest by simply selecting optimal corporate law regimes.
14
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art493.1 Socially optimal locations
Consider ￿rst the social planner￿ s problem of optimally locating two corpo-
rate governance regimes in the static version of the game. The social planner
wishes to choose locations fa1;a2g, and a correspondence a : x ! fa1;a2g









Analysis of this problem leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In the absence of knowledge about the realized value of ￿;
and a regime with two providers, the socially optimal locations (in the
sense of minimizing total expected adaptation costs) are at a1 = 1
4 and
a2 = 3
4; and the socially optimal assignment rule is:
a(x) =
￿




Proof: Since the prices paid are merely transfer payments, the total
social cost of a ￿rm with ideal point x incorporating at ai is given by:
S = ￿ ￿ (x ￿ ai)
2 (14)
Thus, for a given a1 and a2; the social planner would choose a correspon-
dence that assigns the ￿rm to a1 if and only if:
￿ ￿ (x ￿ a1)






At the optimum, given that absence of knowedge about ￿￿ s realized value
implies that ￿rms are uniformly distributed, it must be the case that the
maximum distance travelled by any ￿rm is the same for each location and




￿ a1 = 1 ￿ a2:
Solving yields a1 = 1
4 and a2 = 3
4:￿
From a social welfare perspective, variety is clearly desirable, so that
incorporating ￿rms can choose the location that is least costly for them to
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a thing as ￿too much￿di⁄erentiation. In particular, it is not optimal to
o⁄er corporate governance packages that are polar opposites of each other.
Under these regimes, any incorporating ￿rm whose needs lay somewhere
in the middle would bear an unnecessarily large cost of adapting to either
extreme o⁄ering.
3.2 Private Providers
Having set the baseline for comparison re￿ ected in the social planner￿ s prob-
lem, consider now how private providers will locate in equilibrium. Note
￿rst that if a1 = a2; then the ￿rms will compete only as to price (in Bertrand
fashion), driving price to marginal cost c; and pro￿ts to zero. Suppose in-
stead that a1 6= a2 (as we will show holds in the equilibrium). Recall that
the expected density (that is, in the absence of knowledge about the real-
ization of ￿) of ￿rm types is uniform on [0,1]. Then we can write provider
1￿ s expected demand as:








Its pro￿ts are therefore given by:
￿1 (p1;a1jc;p2;a2) = (p1 ￿ c)D1(p1;a1jc;p2;a2) (17)









Similarly, ￿rm 2 will face expected pro￿ts of:
￿2 (p2;a2jc;p1;a1) = (p2 ￿ c)D2 (p2;a2jc;p1;a1) (18)
= (p2 ￿ c)
￿







Each ￿rm will choose a location and price pair (ai;pi) to maximize pro￿ts,
which in turn yields the following proposition:
Proposition 2: In the absence of knowledge about the true value of ￿; pri-
vate pro￿t-maximizing providers will locate at a1 = 0 and a2 = 1; and
charge prices of p1 = p2 = (c + ￿): This equilibrium is unique.
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￿xed, and consider ￿rm 1￿ s choice of price. Maximizing ￿1 (p1jc;p2) with






























2 + ￿a2 ￿ ￿a1
Solving for p1 and p2 yields:
p￿
1 = c + ￿(a2 ￿ a1)(1 +




2 = c + ￿(a2 ￿ a1)(1 ￿
a1 + a2 ￿ 1
3
)
Under these solutions, denote the maximized pro￿ts for given a1 and a2
for each provider as ￿￿
1 and ￿￿
2. Now consider provider 1￿ s maximization
























a2 ￿ 3a1 ￿ 2
6(a2 ￿ a1)
)
< 0 8 a1
This implies that pro￿ts are always increasing as provider 1 moves to
the endpoint, 0. Similarly, pro￿ts for provider 2 are always increasing as it
moves to the endpoint, 1. Prices at these locations are p1 = p2 = (c + ￿):￿
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. A provider￿ s choice of
location has two competing e⁄ects. On the one hand, moving away from
one￿ s competitor can reduce the size of the market served. On the other
hand, increasing the distance between providers implies that a provider can
charge a higher price because customers have a longer distance to travel
to the competitor location. Proposition 2 demonstrates that when incorpo-
rating ￿rms are uniformly distributed and face quadratic costs, the price
e⁄ect dominates the market share e⁄ect, and thus pro￿ts are increasing in
the distance to the competitor provider. This drives both private providers
to maximize the distance between them, resulting in the corner solution
17
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tition can lead to excessive product di⁄erentiation among competitors.
3.3 Public Providers
Now consider the game where corporate law is provided by public entities
such as states. Denoting ￿i = (pi ￿ c)￿Di and once again assuming that a1 ￿
a2; legislator A1￿ s expected utility is given by E￿ [w(￿1)] and A2￿ s is given by
E￿ [w(￿2)]:Note once again that under condition (9), although legislators
may receive some marginal private bene￿t from raising state revenues, that
marginal bene￿t is zero or negative once revenue exceeds ￿. Analysis of
this strategic setting yields the following:
Proposition 3: In the absence of knowledge about the realized value of ￿
and two public providers, and assuming conditions (10) and (9) hold,
all equilibria satisfying Assumption P consist of pooling equilibria in
which legislators emulate each other￿ s o⁄erings with a1 = a2 = ￿;
where ￿ 2 [0;1]; and charge identical prices p1 = p2 2 [c + 2￿;K]:
Proof: For existence, recall that when a1 = a2 and p1 = p2, D1 = D2 =
1=2: Thus, with p1 = p2 2 [c + 2￿;K], it is clear that ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿; and
therefore U1 = U2 = ￿ U ￿ q (￿) ￿ r(￿) = ￿ U ￿ w: Because this is the maximal
payo⁄ that can be achieved by each player individually, no player has an
a¢ rmative incentive to deviate and Assumption P is clearly satis￿ed.
To see that all equilibria must be in this set, observe that in any locational
pooling equilibrium with a1 = a2 it must also be the case that p1 = p2; if
not, one provider would earn zero pro￿t, and could do strictly better by
matching (or beating) the lower price. Moreover, the only locational pooling
equilibria with prices below c + 2￿ is at p1 = p2 = c: To see this, note that
for any posited equilibrium with identical prices on the interval (c;c + 2￿);
each ￿rm has a strict incentive to undercut the prescribed equilibrium price
by some arbitrarily small amount ". This incentive to undercut one￿ s rival
abates only at the Bertrand outcome where the providers price at marginal
9When costs are less than quadratic, the separation between may fall short of the corner
solutions stated in the text. See, e.g., Economides (1986). What is critical for most of
our argument, however, is the existence of separation of the ￿rms, and not the degree of
that separation. This separation persists even when providers do not fully di⁄erentiate
their o⁄erings, and even (in a probabilistic sense) when the only equilibrium for private
providers is in mixed strategies (as is the case, for instance, when incorporating ￿rms face
linear distance costs).
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equilibria stated in the Proposition, it is ruled out by Assumption P.
Now consider potential equilibria that involve locational separation (i.e.,
without loss of generality, a1 < a2). In any such equilibrium, regardless
of prices charged, the players must split the market into two segments, in
which customers on the interval [0;x￿] go to provider 1 (with the remainder
going to provider 2), and where x￿ 2 [0;1]. If x￿ ￿ 1
2; then player 1￿ s
payo⁄ is w(0) = w whenever ￿ = ￿2; as it will have a zero market share:
Similarly, if x￿ ￿ 1
2;the same is true for player 2 whenever ￿ = ￿1. Thus,
regardless of x￿; one of these outcomes will occur at least 1
2 of the time,
which is Pareto inferior from an ex ante standpoint to the posited pooling
equilibrium, violating Assumption P.￿
The intuition and generalization behind this result underscores a key
feature of public provision. While it is true, as much of the literature on
regulatory competition assumes10, that states will be loathe to enact laws
that run the risk of being disfavored by incorporating ￿rms, the legislative
incentive to provide ￿optimal￿corporate law is truncated by the fact that
legislators do not enjoy any bene￿t from marginal pro￿ts once they have
reached the point at which the marginal cost of converting those public
pro￿ts into improved reelection chances exceeds the marginal private ben-
e￿t from a higher probability of reelection. Emulating existing o⁄erings
guarantees a 1=n share of the market; prices will then be set to maximize
the private bene￿t available from generating state revenues. Legislators can
do no better by o⁄ering di⁄erentiated corporate law regimes and indeed,
given the positive probability that they will lose all corporate law revenues
and will, under our assumption that corporate law revenues have some re-
election bene￿t, do strictly worse.
Neither the public nor the private solution coincides with the social op-
timum (in the sense of minimizing the summed expected costs of consumers
and producers). Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that private provi-
sion, in general, comes closer in welfare terms. This is demonstrated in our
next proposition.
Proposition 4: In the absence of information about the realized value of ￿,
and under Assumption P, private provision of corporate law imposes
social costs that are weakly lower than those imposed by public provi-
sion. Moreover, for any public provision equilibrium in which ￿ 6= 1
2;
private provision is strictly preferred on a social cost basis.
10For a discussion of this point, see Romano (1985).
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Note that this equality is strict for all ￿ 6= 1
2: Thus, in no instance does any
equilibrium of the public chartering game satisfying Assumption P achieve
a lower level of expected social costs than does private provision. ￿
Private provision, although it is distorted from the ￿rst-best by the im-
perfect competition that characterizes spatial markets, nonetheless outper-
forms public provision because some di⁄erentiation in regimes is better than
none when incorporating ￿rms are, in expectation, uniformly distributed.
With only a single location to choose from under public provision, the ￿rms
that must ￿travel￿the greatest distance (distort their optimal governance
structure the most) will in general have to travel further than they would
if there are two or more di⁄erentiated providers, as there are under private
provision. Only in the special case in which public regulators all choose
to locate in the middle of the interval￿ in which case the maximum distance
travelled is 1=2￿ does public provision match private provision in welfare
terms.
4 Dynamic Equilibrium
We now turn to consider what happens when there are multiple periods
and the potential for learning the true value of ￿. In particular, consider
a 2-period extension of the model with no discounting, and let t 2 f1;2g
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denote the locations of the ￿rms at






denote the prices charged by the ￿rms in each
period. Legislators face re-election at the end of each period.
The importance of the dynamic context in our analysis is informational.
Repeat play creates the potential for the parties to learn about the un-
derlying characteristics of the population, regardless of whether they are
private providers or public providers. In considering these two cases below,
we assume throughout that before choosing a second period strategy, the
providers observe the location choices, price choices and market shares of
each provider which obtained during period 1. As before, we presume that
all providers know the distribution of F(x j ￿).
Proposition 5: In a dynamic regime with the potential for learning the
true value of ￿, it is socially optimal to adopt di⁄erentiated locations





4 and to charge identical prices p1 = p2 = p: If










Proof: The optimal period 1 solution, as shown in Proposition 1, is for
providers to di⁄erentiate in location. Note that any time the ￿rms di⁄erenti-








;￿(a2 ￿ a1)(2 ￿ a1 ￿ a2)
￿
,
so that x￿ is interior on (0;1). Given that the social planner￿ s static opti-
mum stipulates (p2 ￿ p1) = 0 and calls for locational separation, it cannot
be improved upon in the dynamic game. Thus, the optimal locations for the
second period will depend on whether provider 1 or provider 2 serves all ￿rms
in the ￿rst period, implying ￿ = ￿1 or ￿ = ￿2 (respectively). In period 2,
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1 = 1 ￿ a2





Of importance, learning turns out to be a costless by-product of any
product di⁄erentiation that characterizes the socially optimal solution in
period 1. Similarly, it is easy to see that private pro￿t-maximizing providers
will also learn the true value of ￿ as a consequence of di⁄erentiation in period
1.
Proposition 6: In the dynamic regime with the potential to learn, the unique
equilibrium outcome for private pro￿t-maximizing providers is to adopt
di⁄erentiated period 1 locations as speci￿ed in Proposition 2, and then
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then ￿rm 1 will remain at a2
1 = 0 in period 2 while ￿rm 2 will move
to a2
2 = 1







: If ￿ = ￿2,
then ￿rm 2 will remain in the same location in period 2 while ￿rm 1
will move to a2
1 = 1








Proof : The period 1 equilibrium, as shown in Proposition 2, is for
providers to be di⁄erentiated at fa1;a2g = f0;1g: Assuming this ￿rst period
equilibrium persists in the dynamic game (see below), the period 1 outcome
would induce precise learning about ￿: either provider 1 serves all ￿rms,
implying ￿ = ￿; or provider 2 serves all ￿rms, implying that ￿ = ￿2. As
such, under this posited equilibrium, in period 2 the ￿rms are known to be
uniformly distributed on [0; 1
2] or [1
2;1]. In any of these cases, as demon-
strated in Proposition 2, the incentives of private providers is to di⁄erentiate
maximally in locations within the support of the relevant posterior distribu-
tion. This immediately yields the locations stated in the proposition. Given
that the ￿rms always obtain the bene￿ts of learning when they di⁄erentiate
their o⁄erings in period 1, they can do no better in that period than play the
static equilibrium in period 1 (which maximizes their static payo⁄s in that
period.) ￿
As with the social planning problem, under private provision learning is
a costless by-product of the di⁄erentiation that maximizes static pro￿ts for
each provider in the ￿rst period. The opportunity to learn creates an op-
portunity to increase pro￿ts in period 2. The intuition behind the particular
result for period 2 can be seen by recognizing that when learning occurs at
the end of period 1, one of the private providers will discover that its mar-
ket share exceeds one-half because the distribution of incorporating ￿rms is
skewed towards the corporate regime o⁄ered by that provider. Recall that
even with the expected uniform distribution, this provider is driven to the
end-point of the interval because marginal pro￿ts are everywhere increas-
ing in distance from the other provider. With the actual distribution even
more pro￿table at this point, the incentive to increase distance remains,
again driving the provider to the end-point. Moreover, with a larger share
of the distribution at this endpoint, the competitive pressure on pricing is
reduced and so even this e⁄ect drives the provider to increase, not decrease,
distance from the competitor. On the other hand the provider which ￿nds
itself at the opposite end of the interval, with less than half the market (ac-
tually, zero given our distributional assumption), now has an incentive to
move closer to the mass of the distribution.
Public providers, on the other hand, do not face an incentive to learn
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Proposition 7: In the dynamic regime with the potential to learn, under
Assumption P, public providers adopt the same undi⁄erentiated loca-
tions in period 1 as in Proposition 3, and each enjoys a 1/2 market
share. As such, neither is able to infer the realized value of ￿, and
they therefore repeat the static equilibrium in period 2.
Proof: Begin with period 2 and suppose for a contradiction that di⁄er-
entiated locations have been chosen and thus learning has occurred in period
1. In any full information equilibrium in period 2 satisfying Assumption
P it must be the case that both legislators choose location and price so that
￿1 = ￿2 = ￿ ￿ because this maximizes utility and can be achieved, as we saw
in Proposition 3, by pooling and setting p1 = p2 ￿ c + 2￿ ￿. Because this
maximum level of utility can be achieved without learning, however, di⁄er-
entiation in period 1 does not increase utility in period 2. The as shown
in Proposition 3, under Assumption P, legislators will continue to pool in
period 1.￿
This result follows directly from the basic result in Proposition 3, that
legislators have no incentive to do better than achieving the pro￿t level that
maximizes their private return, ￿ ￿. Since this target can be met without
learning, there is no incentive to learn. Even if learning does occur, legis-
lators will continue to emulate each other and maximize the private bene￿t
from public revenues; there is no risk of being ￿left out￿if other legislators
choose to learn.
Our ￿nal proposition demonstrates that even in the dynamic case, pri-
vate provision always imposes strictly lower social costs than does public
provision of corporate law.
Proposition 8: In a dynamic regime with the potential for learning the
true realization of ￿, under Assumption P, private chartering imposes
expected social costs that are strictly lower than those imposed by public
chartering.
Proof: Consider ￿rst public provision, in which the static pooling equi-
librium is simply repeated. Under public provision, expected social costs
(as demonstrated in Proposition 4) are equal to ￿
￿1
3 ￿ ￿ + ￿2￿
+ c in each
period. Under private provision, expected social costs in period 1 are just as
in the static case (and Proposition 4), and are equal to 1
12￿ + c: In period 2
under private provision, however, providers learn and adjust their locations
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Thus total expected social costs under public provision exceed those at-











Note that the left hand side of the above inequality is minimized when ￿ = 1
2:
Imposing this lower bound on the left hand side of the above expression yields:
1
6




which is clearly satis￿ed for all ￿ > 0; and thus in the dynamic game,
public provision imposes a larger expected social cost regardless of the pooling
location ￿.￿
As seen above in Proposition 6, the adaptation induced through learning
about population characteristics (i.e., ￿) leads the private provider at the
high mass end of the distribution of incorporating ￿rms to remain at the
endpoint of the interval and the other private provider to move closer to the
mass of the distribution. This reduces the distance that incorporating ￿rms
have to ￿travel,￿ that is, the extent to which they have to deviate from their
optimal governance regime. Overall, under private provision adaptation in
the face of information about the true value of ￿ reduces the total travelling
and hence social costs relative to the period 1. Public provision, on the
other had, shows no adaptation and hence no gain relative to period 1.
Since we have already seen that public provision in the static case has too
little di⁄erentiation relative to private provision, it follows that when we
add the potential social bene￿ts of learning, public provision continues to
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and lacks learning. Both e⁄ects lead to the superiority of private provision
of corporate law.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The analysis above spotlights at least two speci￿c reasons that the provision
of corporate law by pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms can achieve greater e¢ ciency
than when corporate law is provided by public entities. In the static one-
shot case, private entities o⁄er di⁄erentiated regimes for a heterogeneous
population of incorporating ￿rms, which is closer to the ￿rst-best than the
emulation exhibited by public regulators. Public regulators motivated by
private bene￿ts essentially act in a risk-averse fashion: they can maximize
the re-election (or other private bene￿t) payo⁄ from generating state rev-
enues by emulating the o⁄erings of other public regulators and see no bene￿t
to di⁄erentiation.
In the dynamic case, di⁄erentiation among private providers provides
a further social bene￿t, namely information about the true distribution of
incorporating ￿rms. Private providers then respond to the incentive to inno-
vate and improve their o⁄erings to achieve a better ￿t with the diverse needs
of the market. The emulation that characterizes public provision, however,
imposes a further cost in dynamic environments, as it fails to generate so-
cially useful information about the actual distribution of incorporating ￿rms.
Even here, the functional risk-aversion that emanates from re-election goals
gives public regulators no incentive to gamble in order to learn more about
the needs of the incorporating population.
The characteristic of public provision that our model predicts￿ with pub-
lic providers clumping at a single point and failing to provide di⁄erentiated
regimes that may be better tailored to a diverse population of incorporating
￿rms￿ ￿nds some support empirically as well. Consider, for example, the
following chart summarizing various state takeover laws during the 1990s
that are tracked by the Investor Responsibility Research Center. For each
such provision, the chart depicts the percentage of states who have adopted
25
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FIGURE 1: State Corporation Law Provisions During
the 1990s.
At least two aspects of the ￿gure are interesting, and consistent with our
thesis. First, there appears to be remarkable stability during the decade:
On only eight in thirteen years did a state alter any of its reported corporate
law provisions between reporting years ￿and only one state (Nevada) al-
tered more than one provision during the decade. Given how turbulent the
1990s were from an economic perspective, one might predict that a pro￿t
maximizing set of providers would ￿nd it optimal to alter their legal struc-
tures to adapt to the changing environment. Apparently, however, very few
did.
The second interesting feature is to note the clustering of the tracked
legal landscape across states. Of the six legislative areas tracked, four of
them are consistetly clustered at over 85%, and three of them over 92% of
states. Moreover, the variety of statutory patterns among states appears
to be relatively small. A principal components analysis, in fact, reveals
that three factors are capable of explaining over 80% of the variation in
the state-level data.12 This signi￿cant clumping and relative homogeneity
11These include business compition laws, fair price laws, control share laws, cash out
laws, and multi-constituency laws.
12￿ =0.8074; SE (￿) =0.0117.
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fail to capture the extent to which some state court systems (e.g., Delaware￿ s
chancery courts) enjoy a comparative advantage in quality of adjudication
over other competor states (e.g., Kahan & Kamar, 2001; 2002), but the
apparent inactivity of state legislatures seems nonetheless telling.
Our model also provides some basis for another observation that is some-
times made about the nature of state competition over corporate law, namely
that states are motivated by their interest in not losing, as opposed to gain-
ing, corporate law business. Macey and Miller (1987) and Eisenberg (1983)
suggest that Delaware, for example, may be particularly motivated to adapt
its corporate law so as not to lose what has becomes a signi￿cant source
of revenue for the state treasury. Our model captures this in equilibrium
reasoning: our public providers pool on a single location, and do not risk
di⁄erentiation even in a dynamic setting, because they risk real losses if the
state loses "customers" and do not perceive any real gain from trying to
attract a larger market share.
An important generalization of our model would treat the number of
providers, public or private, as an endogenous feature of equilibrium. Our
conjecture is that this generalization would magnify the di⁄erences between
public and private provision. Free entry will introduce, in the case of private
provision, the possibility of excessive di⁄erentiation as sometimes character-
izes models with spatial competition. Free entry (and exit) under public
provision, however, may well reduce the number of public providers. Public
providers essentially divide up the possible revenues from servicing the needs
of incorporating ￿rms in order to maximize the private bene￿ts derived from
public revenues. As the number of public providers increases and hence the
market share of each provider decreases, the price that must be charged in
equilibrium increases: as we saw, equilibrium requires a price that nets the
revenues of ￿ ￿.
Perhaps more interestingly, however, is the e⁄ect of introducing hetero-
geneity among legislators in terms of ￿ ￿, the equilibrium revenue target for
maximizing private bene￿ts. Legislators in states with smaller populations
and hence smaller state budgets overall may have lower ￿ ￿ and may be able to
e⁄ectively underprice competitor legislators from large states. Larger states
may also be ones in which the "productivity" of corporate law revenues
from the legislator￿ s reelection perspective (q0(￿)) is low or negligible, due
to the low salience of this source of revenue; low salience may also make the
cost of transforming corporate law revenue increases into improved reelec-
tion chances (r0(￿)) high, implying that legislators in larger states will be
relatively uninterested in competing for corporate law revenues. Our con-
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is likely to lead to the result that corporate law is provided only by states
where ￿ ￿ is relatively low. Such a result would shed interesting light on the
fact that, as we observe, the provision of corporate law is not only in fact
concentrated in a dominant state but that the dominant state￿ Delaware￿ is
small.13
A more general model might also take into account the role of courts,
in addition to legislators, in developing corporate law. Courts learn from
their adjudications about the nature of the ￿rms they regulate. There is a
literature, beginning with Posner (1973) devoted to assessing the claim that
judge-made law will evolve to e¢ ciency. Several authors have demonstrated
limitations to the capacity of courts to develop e¢ cient rules through ad-
judication. For example, Had￿eld (1992) has argued that learning through
serial adjudication may be hampered by selection bias on the learning path,
and similarly Talley (1999) has analyzed whether legal precedent has the
makings of an information cascade. Ostensibly, legislators face the capacity
to overcome these judicial constraints on learning: they can be proactive and
not merely reactive in collecting data. As our model has shown, however,
they may not face the incentive to take advantage of their superior capacity
(relative to courts) to learn.
An expanded model might also take more explicit account of the role
of interest groups￿ such as the legal profession￿ in generating incentives for
states to produce corporate law. Our model provides a partial analysis
of the role of interest groups: we can interpret the "public" pro￿ts gen-
erated from corporate law to include the pro￿ts earned by lawyers in the
state. (Macey and Miller (1987) discuss the role of the legal profession in
the development of Delaware corporate law.) From the legislator￿ s perspec-
tive, these pro￿ts may also be transformed into a private bene￿t at some
cost, and we would expect again that in equilibrium legislator￿ s may have
exhausted the cost-e⁄ective use of this source of revenues to improve reelec-
tion chances. Our model is not, however, a complete model of the role of
lawyers as an interest group, both because it does not take into account how
lawyers price their services nor does it consider the possibility that lobbying
e⁄orts by the corporate bar may be directed speci￿cally to the enactment of
particular corporate law provisions. In our model, campaign contributions
from interest groups are implicitly assumed to arise simply from the gener-
13Our model would therefore provide a way of making concrete Eisenberg￿ s (1983) sug-
gestion that states that rely on corporate law revenues for a larger share of total revenues
will be more responsive to demand among incorporating ￿rms.
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proposals. Our model does provide a framework for analyzing these more
particularized interest group e⁄ects, notably because we show that almost
any location can be an equilibrium under public provision. This would al-
low interest group preferences over speci￿c locations (such as corporate law
that encourages higher litigation rates, bene￿tting the legal profession, as
Macey and Miller (1987) suggest) to be incorporated.
Models with more complex descriptions of public incentives to create
law will not, however, displace our fundamental point that public providers
do not face pro￿t-maximization incentives and hence public "competition"
over the provision of law will not, in general, mimic market provision. Public
providers face a cost in transforming public revenues into private bene￿ts.
This is an insight that applies not only to state competition over corporate
law but, indeed, to the wide range of settings in which the economic theory
of regulatory competition (Stigler 1971, Peltzman 1976) is applied.
In fact, we ultimately seek to shift the debate about regulatory com-
petition onto di⁄erent terrain than the traditional literature. That litera-
ture focuses only on competition between public entities, looking for ways in
which that competition might mimic competition between pro￿t-maximizing
￿rms. But when law is addressed to its economic function￿ when "good" law
is de￿ned in terms of its capacity to structure e¢ cient market relationships
such as those between shareholders and managers in the corporation￿ there
is no obvious reason why this law should be provided by the state. Indeed,
the basic premise of market democracies is that the market will, in general,
do a better job than the state in achieving e¢ ciency goals in the design
and provision of services, in producing what Romano (1985) called "law as
product." Law in its economic function, we claim, is an economic input.
Showing that private provision will outperform public provision of this in-
put is not that di⁄erent from showing that private provision of any good or
service will generally outperform public provision because of the bene￿ts of
pro￿t-maximization incentives.
We do not, however, want to give short-shrift to two important limi-
tations on this point. First, as we recognize throughout modern market
democracies, real-life competitive markets often depart from the ideal and
often will require public regulation and intervention to overcome market
failures. If market failures are su¢ ciently severe, it may be that public pro-
vision is preferable: in this setting the choice is a matter of comparative
institutional competence and performance. We would expect that a more
complete inquiry into the private provision of corporate law would have to
examine the potential for market failures and hence the need for regulation
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Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, we recognize that not all fea-
tures of "corporate law" are concerned exclusively with e¢ ciency. Modern
market democracies seek to achieve multiple goals, only one of which is
e¢ cient production of goods and services. Our model measures the social
bene￿ts of corporate law in e¢ ciency terms only. We do not by this intend to
claim that non-e¢ ciency goals have no place in corporate law. The achieve-
ment of non-e¢ ciency goals, however, is not displaced by private provision
of those features of corporate law that are e¢ ciency-based. The world of
private corporate law regimes is still a world subject to public regulation.
Even if the rules governing judicial scrutiny of managerial discretion or the
use of takeover defenses are set by a private corporate law regime with e¢ -
ciency goals in mind, that does not preclude public regulation if and where
non-e¢ ciency values are at stake, such as politically-determined limitations
on ￿rm size or labor force and community disruption from takeovers.
Our basic claim, however, is that we would do well to recognize that
law simultaneously serves both narrow economic/e¢ ciency functions and
broader democratic functions. To the extent that the former matters (even
if only as a factor of the larger analysis), there is good reason to explore the
potential for private provision of law.
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